The state root transition proof circuit
This circuit proves the correctness of each state root transition.
- Public Inputs
- Private Inputs
- Check 1: That the message has been encrypted with the correct key
- Check 2: that the message is part of the message tree
- Check 3: that the new state root transition is the correct result of executing the given command — or — that the command is invalid and the no-op flag is set to true.
- Circuit logic
- Circuit failure modes
Public Inputs
All public inputs are set by the contract.
Pseudocode name | Description |
---|---|
coordinatorPubKey | The coordinator's public key |
currentStateRoot | The current state root |
msgTreeRoot | The Merkle root of the message tree |
msgTreePathIndex | The Merkle path index of the message in the message tree |
maxStateLeafIndex | The maximum leaf index of the state tree |
userCurrentLeafPathIndex | The Merkle path index from the user's latest valid state leaf to the current state root |
newStateRoot | The new state root |
Private Inputs
All private inputs are set by the coordinator.
Pseudocode name | Description |
---|---|
userCurrentLeafPathElements | The Merkle path elements from the user's latest valid state leaf to the current state root |
currentVoteOptionPathElements[n] | The Merkle path needed to prove the existence of the current vote option leaf. Size is 253 * vote_option_tree_depth bits |
newVoteOptionPathElements[n] | The Merkle path needed to update the vote option tree root in the state leaf. Size is 253 * vote_option_tree_depth bits |
currentVoteWeight | In the quadratic voting use case, this is the square root of the number of voice credits a user wishes to spend on this vote. Size is 32 bits. |
message | The message |
msgTreePathElements | The Merkle path elements to the message tree root from the message leaf |
randomLeaf | Random data |
newStateTreePathIndex | The Merkle path index to the new state root from the new state leaf |
newStateTreePathElements | The Merkle path elements to the new state root from the new state leaf |
newStateTreePathElementsToZero | The Merkle path elements to the new state root from leaf 0, after the new state leaf has been updated |
userCurrentLeaf | The user's latest valid state leaf |
command | The command to process. Includes all the details in the leaf. |
noOp | The no-op flag |
userPubKey | The public key associated with the private key used to sign the command |
encPubKey | The ephermeral public key used to generate the ECDH shared key which was used to encrypt the command. |
coordinatorPrivKey | The coordinator's private key. |
For the sake of simplicity, in this specification, we assume that there is no batching of commands and we handle each command one at a time.
Check 1: That the message has been encrypted with the correct key
// Derive the coordinator's public key from
// their private key
var derivedCoordinatorPubKey = eddsaDerivePubKey(coordinatorPrivKey)
// Ensure via a constraint that it matches the
// coordinator's public key given as an input
assert(derivedCoordinatorPubKey == coordinatorPubKey)
// Generate the ECDH key
var ecdhSharedKey = genEcdhKey(coordinatorPrivKey, encPubKey)
// Use the ECDH shared key to decrypt the message
var decryptedCommand = decrypt(ecdhSharedKey, message)
// Ensure via a constraint that the message has been correctly decrypted
assert(decryptedCommand == command)
Check 2: that the message is part of the message tree
var generatedMsgTreeRoot = generateMerkleRoot(
msgTreePathElements,
msgTreePathIndex,
message
)
assert(generatedMsgTreeRoot, msgTreeRoot)
Check 3: that the new state root transition is the correct result of executing the given command — or — that the command is invalid and the no-op flag is set to true.
Circuit logic
The message should already have been decrypted to decryptedCommand
(see above).
/***********************************
This function generates a state leaf
***********************************/
function generateStateLeaf(
command,
computedNewVoteOptionRoot,
newVoiceCreditBalance
) => {
return [
command.newPublicKeyX,
command.newPublicKeyY,
computedNewVoteOptionRoot,
newVoiceCreditBalance,
command.nonce + 1
]
}
/*************************
// The main circuit logic:
**************************/
// Record in a variable that the new state leaf index is
// valid (i.e. it is leq to the maximum allowed value)
var validStateLeafIndex = newStateTreePathIndex <= maxStateLeafIndex && newStateTreePathIndex > 0
// Record in a variable if the signature is valid
var validSignature = verifyEddsa(signature, decryptedCommand, userPubKey)
// Record in a variable if the nonce is correct
var correctNonce = decryptedCommand.nonce == userCurrentLeaf.nonce + 1
// Prove that the user's current leaf is part of the
// Merkle tree. Note that this check is independent of
// the noOp flag. As such, the coordinator cannot
// create an invalid proof by tampering with the
// Merkle proof and setting noOp to true; the Merkle proof
// *must* be valid.
var x = generateMerkleRoot(
userCurrentLeafPathElements,
userCurrentLeafPathIndex,
userCurrentLeaf
)
assert(x == currentStateRoot)
// Prove that the the current vote option weight (leaf)
// input is correct by checking that it exists in the
// tree at the given index
var y = generateMerkleRoot(
decryptedCommand.currentVoteOptionPathElements,
decryptedCommand.voteOptionIndex,
decryptedCommand.currentVoteWeight
)
assert(y == userCurrentLeaf.voteOptionTreeRoot)
// Record in a variable if the user has enough
// voice credits
var newVoiceCreditBalance =
userCurrentLeaf.voiceCreditBalance +
(decryptedCommand.currentVoteWeight ^ 2) -
(decryptedCommand.newVoteWeight ^ 2)
var enoughVoiceCredits = newVoiceCreditBalance >= 0
// Record in a variable if the new leaf's vote option
// tree root is the correct result of updating the
// vote option leaf.
var computedNewVoteOptionRoot =
updateMerkleTree(
command.voteOptionIndex,
command.voteOptionPath,
command.voteWeight,
decryptedCommand.newVoteWeight
)
assert(newStateLeaf.voteOptionRoot == computedNewVoteOptionRoot)
newStateLeaf.voteOptionRoot == computedNewVoteOptionRoot
// Record in a variable if the vote option index is
// within a permissible range (0 to 2 ** vote option tree
// depth, inclusive) where VOTE_OPTION_TREE_DEPTH is
// not an input, but rather hardcoded during the trusted
// setup.
var validVoteOptionTreeIndex = command.voteOptionIndex < VOTE_OPTION_TREE_DEPTH
var newStateLeaf = generateStateLeaf(
command,
computedNewVoteOptionRoot,
newVoiceCreditBalance
)
if (enoughVoiceCredits &&
correctNonce &&
validSignature &&
validStateLeafIndex &&
validVoteOptionTreeIndex
):
// Use a constraint to ensure that the no-op flag
// is set to false
assert(noOp == false)
// Generate the new state root.
var s = merkleTreeUpdate(
newStateTreePathIndex
newStateLeaf,
currentStateRoot,
newStateTreePathElements
)
// Update the leaf at index `0` to generate a new state
// root, and ensure via a constraint that it is equal
// to the new state root passed to the snark as an
// input.
var updatedStateRoot = merkleTreeUpdate(
0,
randomLeaf,
s,
newStateTreePathElementsToZero
)
assert(updatedStateRoot == newStateRoot)
else:
// Use a constraint to ensure that the no-op flag
// is set to true
assert(noOp == true)
Circuit failure modes
Condition | noOp flag | Outcome |
---|---|---|
Insufficient voice credits | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid nonce | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid signature | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid new vote option root | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid state leaf index | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid vote option tree index | true | Valid proof, but only leaf 0 is updated |
Invalid Merkle path to the current state root | N/A | No such proof can be generated |
Invalid Merkle path to the current vote option root | N/A | No such proof can be generated |